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NOTE: Originally a talk before the Philosophical Society 
of England, on the topic of “French Philosophy”. It was 
revised over the course of the strange and long drawn out 
aftermath of the referendum on the United Kingdom’s 
membership of the European Union, and that is reflected in 
the way in which it unfolds.
***
Philosophy, from Descartes onwards, if not earlier, is for 
the most part written in a particular national language: 
French, German, English, Italian; yet it has always 
aspired to say something universally, absolutely true. 
But can a universal truth be expressed in a particular 
language? According to a classic, Platonic vision of 
philosophy, the universal (the abstract idea) and the 
particular (the concrete sensuous thing) are separated 
by a gulf. And as Alain Badiou, a French philosopher 
who is also an avowed Platonist, puts it, this seems to 
risk contaminating and distorting the Truth with the 
contingent features of our particular “situation”.
PHILOSOPHY IS CONFRONTED 
WITH A CERTAIN PARADOX: IT 
NEEDS TO MAKE STATEMENTS 
THAT ARE TRUE EVERYWHERE, 
FOR EVERYONE, FOR ALL TIME, 
YET ALMOST AS INEVITABLY, IT 
MUST SPEAK IN A WAY THAT 
IS PECULIARLY LOCAL
To achieve philosophy’s universal ends, are we in fact 
forced to relinquish as far as possible our more or less 
“natural” language together with its particularities, and 
approach a purely artificial or “technical” language – a 
set of symbols, like mathematics or formal logic (our 
“P”s and “Q”s)?
Philosophy, then, is confronted with a certain paradox: 
it needs to make statements that are true everywhere, 
for everyone, and for all time, and yet almost as 
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inevitably, it must speak in a way 
that is peculiarly local. There is 
perhaps no other discourse which 
aspires to the same conjunction 
of universality and particularity, 
from the extremes of literature and 
poetry, to logic, mathematics, and 
mathematicised science. Between 
the poetic and the mathematical 
stands philosophy.
Let us consider the simple 
phrase “French philosophy”: this 
syntagm gathers up within itself 
both particularity (French) and 
universality (Philosophy), and 
thus the very idea of a “national 
philosophy” presents us with 
a problem: how can these two 
belong together in one entity? 
How can modern philosophy itself 
be possible? More generally, our 
question is: how can philosophy 
achieve the aim that it sets for 
itself: to speak the truth? – A 
truth that would be true always 
and everywhere, even for those 
who cannot understand the 
language that I speak, and who 
remain unacquainted with the 
particularities of my situation.
This rather abstract philosophical 
questioning will in the end help us 
to make sense of one of our many 
current political predicaments: 
the apparent opposition between 
nationalism and cosmopolitanism 
that was so vividly posed as such 
in the relatively recent and still 
undecided referendum in the 
United Kingdom.
***
In response to the question, “[d]
oesn’t the particularity of a language 
make my supposedly universal 
discourse less universal than it 
aspires to be?”, Badiou considers 
one possible and influential 
answer: “[T]here are even a few 
philosophers who were tempted 
to say: ‘Yes, but certain languages 
have universal significance’. Some 
suggested German while others – 
often the same ones – suggested 
Greek”. Badiou is here thinking of 
the German philosophers, Martin 
Heidegger and G.W.F. Hegel, the 
latter of whom wrote: “Luther 
made the Bible speak German […]. 
I may say of my endeavour that I 
wish to teach philosophy to speak 
German”.
IF THOUGHT IS 
TO ENCOMPASS 
THE UNITY OF 
OPPOSITES, 
SO MUST THE 
LANGUAGE WHICH 
ENCOMPASSES 
THOUGHT
Hegel has in mind the fact that 
German seems particularly blessed 
by words that he describes as 
inherently “speculative”, which 
means that they are endowed 
with two opposed meanings, 
such as, most famously, the word 
that names the very procedure of 
his own “dialectical” method of 
thought, which aims at reconciling 
or surpassing pairs of terms that 
philosophy has traditionally treated 
as opposites (such as “universal” 
and “particular” for instance): the 
word is Aufhebung (“sublation”) 
which means both to cancel or 
negate and to maintain or preserve. 
For Hegel, the task of thinking 
is precisely to demonstrate how 
two apparently mutually exclusive 
positions may in fact be viewed 
from another higher standpoint 
as two sides of the same coin. 
“Speculation” derives from the 
Latin word for mirror, speculum, 
and is capable of demonstrating 
that the two opposites which 
it encompasses are not two 
disparate things, but a single 
entity and its own inverse, as yet 
unrecognised, mirror image. If 
thought is to encompass the unity 
of opposites, so must the language 
which encompasses thought, and 
German in particular is suited to 
the universal rationality of thought 
precisely because, by happy chance, 
it contains a number of such 
delightfully speculative terms.
As Jacques Derrida has pointed 
out, even if one resists saying 
that one language is essentially 
more philosophical or more 
universal than the others, one 
can, in the other direction, 
suggest that certain languages 
are inherently non-philosophical 
or less philosophical than others. 
Indeed, there is a tendency on the 
part of those philosophers lucky 
enough to have been born speaking 
German to suggest that all of the 
Latinate languages are inherently 
unphilosophical. And the same 
could be said – and has been – of 
the English language.
Alain Badiou does not accept this 
singling out of languages. His own 
preference is, in some contexts at 
least, for a language that would 
be absolutely universal, and that 
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is to say: mathematics. Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz had much 
earlier on suggested a symbolic 
language which he named the 
“Universal Characteristic” – a set 
of “characters” of the greatest 
intelligibility and hence the 
greatest imaginable susceptibility 
to translation. To be more precise, 
for Badiou at least, such a symbolic 
language can teach philosophy what 
it might mean to say something 
that is universally true despite the 
fact that every philosopher is in 
some way compelled to speak from 
out of a very particular situation.
This would leave us with at least two 
options when it comes to speaking 
philosophically, which means to 
inscribe a universal truth within a 
particular language:
1) affirm that a particular language 
is capable of capturing the universal 
2) jettison particularity as much as 
possible and adopt a lingua franca 
for philosophy.
***
Up to now, we have let it seem as 
if the necessity for philosophy 
to speak a particular language – 
and that means many different 
languages – were an inconvenience, 
even a serious hindrance to be 
overcome as philosophy attempts 
to be what it is. 
Jacques Derrida sees things in a 
different light: he attempts to show 
that this multiplicity is in fact a 
necessary part of philosophy, and 
may even be numbered among 
its very conditions of possibility. 
This would mean that philosophy 
cannot but speak a certain national 
natural language, and should not 
attempt to flee the particularities 
of its situation, but should embrace 
them.
ANY TOTALITY IS 
FORMED ONLY 
BY MEANS OF AN 
EXCLUSION OF 
SOMETHING THAT 
BELONGS TO IT, 
WHICH RENDERS 
THAT TOTALITY 
INCOMPLETE, AND 
THUS BINDS IT TO 
SOMETHING THAT 
IS NOW OUTSIDE 
OF IT
The question of a national 
philosophy, or as Derrida is 
perhaps more prone to say, a 
“philosophical idiom”, provides 
us with a prime example of 
how Derrida’s “deconstruction” 
functions, and so we might take 
this as an opportunity to learn 
something of this notion: it takes 
a structure (like the discourse of 
philosophy, or a philosophical 
“system”) and demonstrates that 
a certain element of that structure 
makes the structure both possible 
and impossible at the same time. 
The logical or ontological insight 
which follows from this is the 
idea that any totality is formed 
only by means of an exclusion of 
something that belongs to it, which 
renders that totality incomplete, 
and thus binds it to something 
that is now outside of it (having 
been excluded). It is thus part of 
the logic of identity as such that 
each and every individual hangs on 
something other than itself. 
It is important in this context to 
understand the difference between 
what philosophy thinks and says 
about itself, and what is really 
the case (or what is the case from 
another point of view): Derrida’s 
“deconstruction” frequently 
demonstrates this discrepancy to 
philosophy from a vantage point 
that is necessarily somewhat 
marginal with respect to it. Derrida 
explains the situation, as so often, 
in terms of the difference between 
the necessary and the contingent 
or accidental: philosophy tells itself 
that it is “essentially universal and 
cosmopolitan, that national, social, 
idiomatic difference in general 
should befall it only as a provisional 
and non-essential accident that 
could be overcome”. Ideally, the 
Tower of Babel would have reached 
its goal without God’s intervention 
or never have been built in the first 
place, for then the multiplicity 
and confusion of tongues would 
never have irrupted. It is purely 
contingent that it did.
So philosophy tells itself. But this 
contingency is precisely what 
Derrida will dispute, from another 
perspective, somewhat removed 
from philosophy as it has thus far 
unfolded for the most part. He 
suggests, on the contrary, that 
the multiplicity of languages is 
necessarily a part of philosophy. 
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Derrida seems to justify his assertion in terms of 
communication, as if to discuss things we had to 
undergo a certain process of translation, which both 
asserts the existence of a purely idiomatic “private” use 
of language on the part of each interlocutor, but also 
denies it at the same time by asserting its translatability. 
Normally, communication or dialogue is thought of by 
philosophy as inessential, as accidental, or as reducible 
to the solitary monologue of the soul’s dialogue with 
itself (Plato). Any detour beyond this reflexive loop is 
both non-essential and risky since it introduces the 
possibility of misunderstanding and “loss of data”, 
miscommunication. Philosophy’s ideal discourse is a 
circular return to itself.
But deconstruction begins with a critique of the idea 
that meaning is fully constituted in the private interior 
of a meaning-bestowing consciousness, and that its 
translation into a particular language with the act of 
speech is always a compromise that falls short of the 
original intention and, to a greater or lesser extent, 
sullies it. For Derrida, such a journey beyond one’s 
self-enclosure is essential and necessary, not least 
because a public and external (not to say material) 
linguistic system, with all of its constitutively different 
sounds and words, must be employed during any act of 
communication. 
***
Given that we are speaking of language, and languages 
are, in modern Europe, for the most part divided 
up according to their nationality (English, French, 
German…), we must consider the journey beyond one’s 
national borders, through translation and international 
dialogue, as the principal form in which this detour 
occurs within philosophy.
Philosophy itself considers the relation between 
philosophy and nationality to be contingent and 
extrinsic, and yet secretly philosophy knows that the 
very idea of nationality is itself a philosophical idea, 
an idea determined by philosophy itself, and so in 
some way internal to it. The very idea of “nation” is a 
philosophical concept, a notion belonging within the 
armoury of political philosophy: as Derrida has it, 
“the concept and word ‘nation’ are philosophical, and 
could not have been constituted, historically, outside a 
philosophical-type milieu and a discourse marked by a 
certain history of the philosophical as such”.
THE VERY IDEA OF “NATION” 
IS A PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT, 
A NOTION BELONGING WITHIN 
THE ARMOURY OF POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY
To summarise things as they stand: the traditional, 
philosophical position affirms that nationality 
would remain outside of philosophy as such, and 
philosophy would be equally exterior to nationality. 
The deconstructive position, on the other hand, aims to 
demonstrate that philosophy, unbeknownst to itself or 
contrary to what for the most part it avows concerning 
itself, will have overflowed its apparent boundaries; 
and what it imagines to be altogether outside of itself 
is actually a mirage, a projection into the exterior of 
something that is in truth internal to it – a fantasy, 
indeed, but in the strict psychoanalytic sense of an 
image that is necessary to our very sense of our own 
identity, a constitutive exclusion of an imaginary outside 
that makes an individual’s identity as a whole possible 
for the first time, but also strictly impossible since it 
incorporates the very “other” that it thereby excludes.
This means that something of the empirical, the 
contingent and the particular comes to contaminate 
the transcendental, the necessity and universality 
of philosophy; but also that something of the 
philosophical comes to contaminate what philosophy 
itself had previously presented as non-philosophical, 
outside philosophy: nationhood, for instance.
***
Often, philosophers describe our recent history as one 
in which nations and states are declining in terms of 
their geopolitical importance and their power in the 
face of transnational corporations and institutions 
such as NATO, the UN, or the European Union, and 
those organisations related to it. On the radical left, 
one frequently speaks of the state ultimately “withering 
away”, or else one imagines such a thing, and given 
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the state’s intimate intrication with the nation, this 
can make way either for the unbridled sovereignty of 
international Capital, or for a new and international 
solidarity of those disadvantaged by the system as it 
stands. On the right, one tends simply to worry about 
the loss of national sovereignty, and the way in which 
this supposed loss is presented by way of the media 
tends to encourage a resurgence of nationalistic desire.
It would be illuminating here to consider the British 
situation in the wake of a somehow (at the time of writing, 
in September 2019) still-to-be-decided referendum 
which is taken to justify a single nation’s separation 
from a supra-national entity known as Europe, and the 
return of right-wing and other nationalisms at a time 
when the tide of history seemed to some – on both the 
right and the left – to be turning towards federation and 
internationalism, “cosmopolitanism”, whether of free 
trade and movement, or of solidarity. Could Derrida 
endorse such a unidirectional vision of history?
Derrida’s position seems to imply that the desire for 
a return to a national idiom – a certain nationalism 
even – might be eternally present within philosophy 
itself, and that would mean among all the nations of 
Europe, and that even if nations were to some degree 
superseded, this would not then mean that the desire 
for them would also be destroyed.
The essay of Derrida’s from which I draw here 
derives from seminars given in the late 1980’s. At 
the time, Derrida tells us, there has never been more 
(international) communication, travel, and exchange, 
and yet “the effects of opacity, national limits or even 
nationalistic claims have never been as marked as they 
are today”. Perhaps we could say that this is even truer 
in 2019: “we” have never been more nationalistic, 
and never more cosmopolitan. This was one of the 
few things that the referendum proved. This vote, 
exceptionally high in its turn-out, implying that both 
positions actually mattered to the voters, split the 
electorate in half, or at least into two camps, in the way 
of a “binary machine”, as one might call such devices. 
The ballot forced us to divide up amongst ourselves 
into either nationalists (or those in whom the desire 
for nationhood, immunised and isolated identity, was 
overriding) and the internationalists (who value inter-
national exchange and passage more highly).
From a deconstructive point of view, then, the 
referendum result could only have been so split, but 
at the same time it should never have been asked in 
such rigidly disjunctive terms, for to ask an electorate 
unambiguously to decide which of the two tendencies 
is to predominate is to betray the very nature of 
(national) identity: in fact, both national particularity 
and cosmopolitan universality are equally essential.
This is not to say that deconstruction will be neutral: 
it seems that if cosmopolitanism is capable also 
of incorporating a certain nationalism, and if the 
same does not go for nationalism, mutatis mutandis, 
then deconstruction will simply be on the side of 
cosmopolitanism, if it is forced to choose. As indeed, in 
the United Kingdom, it recently was.
This is not simply a question of open borders and the 
end of a certain national cultural identity, for one has 
to be careful to distinguish between two possible senses 
of internationalism: 1) the deconstructive recognition 
of the incompleteness of identity and its dependence 
on the “other”, and 2) the total dissolution of national 
identity and idiom. The latter, we would once have 
said, was most likely to take the form of a globalised 
Anglo-American language and culture, but today this 
is becoming more unclear. Since we are not promoting 
the entire dissolution of national identity, this means 
that an analogous distinction must be made within 
nationalism as well: the latter could bespeak a simple 
isolation(ism) or it could constitute a more moderate 
reaction to the risk of a full loss of national identity 
embodied in the trend towards the international 
according to the second of its valences.
In any case, this duality to be found within each side 
of the opposition gives us yet more cause to assert 
that the very terms of the referendum’s question were 
inadequate to what was at stake, and by no means 
straightforwardly dividing neatly between Left and 
Right. Hence the ongoing situation we remain in at the 
time of writing.
***
But if deconstruction opposes the philosophy of 
history which affirms a decline of the nation-state, 
then does such a position with respect to nationality 
and the apparently eternal and ahistorical character of 
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its contradictory tendencies deprive deconstruction of 
any philosophy of history whatsoever? Does it prevent 
it from saying anything truly insightful about the 
particularity of our historical moment?
EACH EPOCH, IF SUCH A 
THING EXISTS, WOULD BE 
DEFINED BY THE PARTICULAR 
NATIONAL PHILOSOPHY THAT 
IS TEMPORARILY, FOR THE 
DURATION OF THAT ERA, 
ELEVATED TO THE LEVEL OF THE 
UNIVERSAL, THE EMBODIMENT 
OF PHILOSOPHY AS SUCH
Perhaps there is another sense of history which 
deconstruction might learn from Alain Badiou: history 
understood as a sequence that links together Ancient 
Greece, 19th century Germany, and post-war France. 
This would be a history in which certain epochs are 
defined by the ascendancy of a particular national 
philosophy. Perhaps our brief account of nationality 
and national philosophy might encourage us to propose 
such a thing in the name of deconstruction. On this 
account, each epoch, if such a thing exists, would be 
defined by the particular national philosophy that is 
temporarily, for the duration of that era, elevated to the 
level of the universal, the embodiment of Philosophy as 
such. Close to Hegel and Heidegger, but unlike them in 
refusing to restrict philosophical language to the Greek 
and the German, as if their primacy were permanent 
and unquestionable. The result of an election is always 
temporary. The Greek, German, French, or Italian 
philosophy which is said to lead the way in each era 
would capture the very essence of philosophy only by 
constituting the most forceful and original intervention 
of which philosophical thought is capable during that 
period of its history – a contingent empirical part 
promoted to the position of the transcendental, the 
keystone of Philosophy itself.
At the very least, the idea of a national philosophy 
has allowed us to gain some insight into Derrida’s 
philosophy, and this has in turn allowed us to think 
through some aspects of the recent referendum and 
the political situation it both expresses and betrays. 
This in turn has stimulated us to address certain 
questions to deconstruction in turn, on the topic of 
its philosophy of history, to probe its limits, and to 
suggest ways in which thinking might press beyond 
them, so as to conceptualise our current predicament 
more comprehensively.
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